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Abstract
Portrayed as a brilliant Renaissance figure that combined success in the military with the love for knowledge, D. Francisco’s 
patronage is well-known. This article compares the post-mortem written memory of Coutinho with an evaluation of the offices 
he held: the captaincy of Arzila (1546-1549) and the viceroyalty of India (1561-1564). The household and stay of D. Francisco at 
Arzila are analysed, as well as his strategy for recovering the royal grace, marked by his appointments to governor of the “Casa 
da Suplicação” (1559) and the viceroyalty of India (1561). At the viceroyalty, D. Francisco faced great expectations. Comparing 
Coutinho’s policy with the orders he received it is possible to ascertain whether the expectations of his appointment were fulfi-
lled. This article reflects on the relations between different identities within the Portuguese Empire while focusing in a case-study 
of the shaping of historical memory. 
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ENTRE EL RENACIMIENTO Y LA CONTRARREFORMA:  
CONFORMANDO LA MEMORIA HISTÓRICA DE D. FRANCISCO COUTINHO,  
3ER CONDE DE REDONDO (1546-1564)
Resumen
Retratado como una brillante figura renacentista que conjugaba el éxito militar con la pasión por el conocimiento, la labor de 
patronazgo de D. Francisco es bien conocida. Este artículo compara su memoria post-mortem con una evaluación de los cargos 
que ocupó: la capitanía de Arcila (1546-1549) y el virreinato de la India (1561-1564). Se estudian la Casa y primeros años de D. 
Francisco en Arcila, así como su estrategia para recuperar el favor regio, que culminó con sus nombramientos a gobernador de 
la “Casa da Suplicação” (1559) y virrey de la India (1561). En este último destino había grandes expectativas por el desempeño 
de Coutinho; es relevante comparar las órdenes de la Corona para atisbar si tales expectaciones se cumplieron. Este artículo 
reflexiona sobre la relación entre las diferentes identidades del Imperio Portugués, al mismo tiempo que se enfoca en el estudio 
de caso de la construcción de la memoria histórica de Coutinho.
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Introduction2
Coming from a prestigious lineage, the Coutinhos, who 
in the XV century reached the title of Marshall of Portugal 
and became one of the utmost influent lineages due to 
creation of the house of Marialva,3 D. Francisco Coutinho 
(1517?-1564), 3rd earl of Redondo, lived in a crucial time 
when the Portuguese Empire was processing the transition 
to Counter-Reformation. Besides being lord of the house 
of Redondo he was as well one of the most prominent 
noblemen in Portugal. D. Francisco is generally mentioned 
due to the highly important offices he held: his North 
African captaincy of Arzila (1546-1549), his viceroyalty of 
India (1561-1564) and his role as a great courtesan of Kings 
John III and Sebastian.4 Nevertheless, his governments were 
shadowed by misfortunes: at Arzila, a place that had been 
donated to the house of Redondo in 1490,5 due to the royal 
order issuing its abandonment; at India, due to several 
political and military events and his sudden death. 
Somehow, Coutinho is mentioned as the viceroy of 
India who supported both the poet Luís de Camões and 
the physician Garcia de Orta, in 1563, by patronizing 
the publication of Orta’s work.6 Another field where D. 
Francisco’s action as viceroy is known is his conflict with 
the Jesuits and the Crown regarding the Counter-Reformist 
policies for the “Estado da India”, which motivated his 
statement to the King that he did not want to be taken for 
an Erasmus.7 Still unstudied are the reasons of a somewhat 
political and religious alignment with the stand of the 
first archbishop of Goa, D. Gaspar de Leão Pereira, who 
also started by opposing the Jesuits baptisms policy.8 The 
question is mainly relevant considering Coutinho succeeded 
the “missionary viceroy” D. Constantino whose full 
patronage to Counter-Reformation is much debated.9
These facts, combined with the several attempts to 
portray Coutinho as a brilliant military and a successful 
commander,10 explain the interest to study his career and 
deepen the studies on the transition to Counter-Reformation 
in Portuguese Asia11 as well as the effects that D. Francisco’s 
position in this conflict had for the later development of 
the “Estado”. Bearing in mind the controversies during 
King Sebastian’s reign over the implementation of Counter-
Reform in Portuguese Asia,12 it is pertinent to wonder 
2  This article was written within the scope of a post-doctoral 
fellowship at CHAM for the line Renaissance Europe: the “Old” and the 
“New” worlds. In this article we use the expression “Estado da India” 
referring to the Portuguese ports network in Asia and as another asian 
power, as defined by Thomaz 1994: 207-208. 
3  For this House: Oliveira 1999, 2001, 2004.
4  A courtesan source from the XVI century notes several of his 
“sayings”: Ditos…, 99-106.
5  Freire 1973: 336.
6  Orta 1987: 3.
7  Marcocci 2012: 400.
8  Xavier 2008: 131.
9  Pelúcia 2018: 78-80.
10  Specially by Luís de Camões. For further details check points 3.3 
and 3.4
11  Within the same scope check an article on a Coutinho’s prede-
cessor, Governor Francisco Barreto (1555-1558): Vila-Santa 2017.
12  By Counter-Reformist policies in the case of Portuguese Asia, 
we bear in mind the relationship established with Hindu, Muslim, New-
Christian and Jewish communities as well as missionary strategy fol-
lowed by the Crown and the Church. For further details on the subject 
if Coutinho was, on a certain sense, due to his support 
to Orta and Camões, a renascent viceroy in a time of 
Counter-Reformation.
In order to reach a full answer to this question and also 
to discuss the historical memory of Coutinho, it is relevant to 
study the three main stages of his career (Morocco, Portugal 
and India) that later were used to portray him as a successful 
leader. This study will be accomplished, in a first stage, by a 
short reference to the history of the house of Redondo and 
of D. Francisco’s action at the captaincy of Arzila. After the 
trauma that the withdrawal of Arzila inflicted on him and on 
his house, it will be possible to proceed to the second stage 
of his career in the court, previously to his appointment to 
India, which will also be fully detailed. Finally, for the third 
stage, an analysis on his viceroyalty of India will be made, 
focusing on the study of political and military events and 
on his polemics with the Jesuits and the Crown concerning 
Counter-Reformation policies. Ultimately, further debate on 
the significance of his patronage of Camões and Orta will be 
done. In order to achieve a final conclusion on the shaping 
of D. Francisco’s historical memory, a mention will be also 
made to his death and polemical inheritance for India, 
considering the political and military crisis of 1565-1575.
1.  A traumatic loss for the house of Redondo: D. Francisco 
Coutinho and the withdrawal of Arzila (1538-1549)
The house of Redondo descended from its first earl, 
D. Vasco Coutinho, who was son of D. Diogo Coutinho, 
Marshall of Portugal and himself a member of the house of 
Marialva.13 D. Vasco acquired the title of 1st earl of Redondo, 
in 1485, by revealing to King John II (1481-1495) the 
conjuration of the duke of Viseu against him. At that date, 
he had already many privileges and was lord of Borba and 
Estremoz.14 Alike his relatives from the house of Marialva,15 
D. Vasco operated a series of exchanges in order to 
concentrate his lands.16 This took place since, in 1500, King 
Manuel I (1495-1521) donated Borba to D. Jaime, 4th duke 
of Braganza, when he reinstated the house of Braganza. Due 
to this situation, D. Vasco exchanged Borba for Redondo and 
Estremoz for Pavia and also received an annuity from the 
custom-house of Lisbon and had the earl title changed from 
Borba to Redondo. Since he was granted the captaincy of 
Arzila, he spent most of his time there alongside his family,17 
in a tradition that his successors maintained. This donation 
was quite important for D. Vasco’s house because it ensured 
military detachment for all its members and granted royal 
mercies.
When D. Vasco needed to come to Portugal, he 
entrusted the captaincy to his relatives, like his son D. 
João Coutinho, who became 2nd earl of Redondo, in 1522. 
Through a series of marriages with the Mascarenhas, the 
check our article “Resistência e contemporização: tensões políticas na 
implementação da Contra-Reforma no Estado da Índia (1557-1558)” 
which will be published in the book of the International Seminar on 
Martinho Lutero e o Novo Rosto Político-Religioso da Europa.
13  Livro… 1996: 193.
14  Freire 1973: 335-336.
15  Oliveira 1999: 78.
16  Semião 2002: 102 e 110.
17  Idem, 57 and 228.
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Meneses and the Ataídes lineages,18 the house of Redondo 
ensured important connections. This is specially noted in 
the case of the Mascarenhas. If D. Vasco married D. Catarina 
da Silva, niece of the 1st earl of Cantanhede, D. Pedro de 
Meneses, his successor D. João Coutinho married D. Isabel 
Henriques, daughter of Fernão Martins Mascarenhas, 
steeds captain of Kings John II and Manuel I. D. João’s sisters 
also achieved important marriage alliances: D. Margarida 
Coutinho, married D. João Mascarenhas, son of Fernão 
Martins Mascarenhas who inherited his father’s office;19 D. 
Violante Henriques married D. Afonso de Lencastre, son of 
D. Jorge, duke of Coimbra and bastard son of King John II.20 
These marriages explain why, in the absence of D. Vasco and 
D. João Coutinho, the captaincy was usually occupied by 
the Meneses and the Mascarenhas, and above all, the very 
important role the Mascarenhas played in the military aids 
to Arzila in the sieges.21
The death and failure to provide offspring from the 
marriage of D. Guiomar Coutinho, heir of D. Francisco 
Coutinho, 4th earl of Marialva and Loule, to Infant D. Fernando 
(1507-1534), brother of King John III (1521-1557),22 meant 
that the representation of the lineage of the Coutinhos 
passed over to the house of Redondo, which originally 
descended from the house of Marialva. The constant 
Coutinhos’ closeness to the royal family also explains why D. 
João Coutinho, 2nd earl of Redondo and cousin of D. Guiomar 
Coutinho, tried to prevent, without success, the reversion 
of all the patrimony of the house of Marialva and Loule to 
the Crown, and also why he married his heir, D. Francisco 
Coutinho, to D. Violante Henriques, whose fathers were 
detached officers in the house of Infant D. Maria (1521-
1577), sister of King John III.23 It is also plausible that D. 
João Coutinho named his heir as D. Francisco in honor to D. 
Francisco Coutinho, 4th earl of Marialva and the wealthiest 
earl of Portugal at his time.
 Although there are no certainties, it is probable that 
D. Francisco was born in 1517.24 The first reference to him 
dates 1530 when he was present at a lion hunt near Arzila.25 
But, it was only in 1532 that D. Francisco, accompanied by 
his uncle D. João Mascarenhas and his father, had his first 
military experience by attacking fiercely and placing in 
danger the loot from the Alzacar-Quibir alcalde men who 
threatened Arzila.26 In 1534, he saved many lives in another 
fight and even detached himself from his father. In this 
sequence, in 1538, when a truce was signed between the 
King of Portugal, represented by his father D. João Coutinho 
as captain of Arzila, and the sultan of Fez, D. Francisco signed 
as a witness.27 In that year, his father retired from Arzila after 
18  Idem, p. 33.
19  Livro... 1996: 193-194.
20  Semião 2002: 30; Livro… 1996: 30.
21  Rodrigues 2004: 177-179.
22  For this theme: Carvalhal 2014.
23  Livro… 1996: 194.
24  Bernardo Rodrigues who met D. Francisco at Arzila states that 
in 1534 he was less than 17 years old (Rodrigues, Bernardo, 1915, cap. 
XLVI), which would place his birth in 1517/18, while Diogo do Couto who 
met him in India, says he died in 1564 at the age of 61 years, which 
would place his birth in 1503 (Couto 1974, VII: x, 17).
25  Sousa 1951, tome II, chap V.
26  Rodrigues 1915, chap. XLVI.
27  Idem, chap. LXVII.
ending his second captaincy and because D. Francisco was 
too young to assume it, Arzila was entrusted to his uncle D. 
Manuel Mascarenhas. Due to the military emergence of the 
Saadid dynasty which threatened to conquer Fez and taking 
into account the close relationship D. João Coutinho had 
always maintained with this sultan, the royal ambassador 
to Fez, in 1542, stated that he asked for D. João’s return to 
Arzila since he preferred seeing it governed by a Coutinho.28
But D. João Coutinho did not return and in 1543 the 
peace between Portugal and Fez was broken.29 However, 
the main threat to Arzila did not come from Fez but from the 
Alcazar-Quibir alcalde, rebelled to this sultan, who, in 1544, 
sieged Arzila and injured severely D. Manuel Mascarenhas.30 
Once again the rule of a Coutinho was demanded31 but, for 
unclear reasons, D. Francisco did not assume the captaincy. 
Instead, in 1545, he participated secretly, without the formal 
knowledge of D. Manuel Mascarenhas,32 in the negotiations 
with the sultan of Fez for a formal alliance with Portugal 
against the Saadids, who had united southern Morocco 
and were threatening Fez. Although this alliance was not 
reached, D. Francisco played an important role in assisting 
his uncle in the attempt33 and in discussing with him the 
military raids.34
D. Francisco was to be formally named as captain of Arzila 
only in 1546 after a probable return to Portugal. Although a 
source mentions that he started by going to Tangier as a royal 
punishment for a bad behavior that is not mentioned,35 the 
truth is that he signed his first known document as captain 
of Arzila on April 1546.36 The constant threats to both Arzila 
and Alcacer Ceguer, from the alcaldes of Alcazar-Quibir, 
Tetuan and Xexuan, alongside their intention to ally with the 
Saadids to destroy the sultan of Fez, explain why D. Francisco 
united his forces with Francisco Botelho, captain of Alcacer 
Ceguer, in order to clear up the threats in 1547 and 1548.37 
Despite details are not well-known, there is information 
that in 1548 D. Francisco broke the siege of 2500 men that 
these three alcalds launched to Arzila. He also succeeded 
in preventing another siege from them to Alcacer Ceguer, 
defeating them a second time. These services ensured him 
a letter from King John III thanking his action.38 
On January 1549, when the Saadids conquered Fez 
and showed interest in occupying Alcacer Ceguer,39 John III 
ordered D. Afonso de Noronha, captain of Ceuta, to build 
a fortress at Seinal in order to protect Alcacer Ceguer.40 
28  Letter from Sebastião de Vargas to John III, Fez, 30.VII.1542 – 
Rodrigues 1915, doc. XXXVII.
29  Cruz 1997: 143.
30  Andrade 1976, part III, chap. LXXXXVI.
31  Letter from Sebastião de Vargas to King John III, Arzila, 15.XI.1544 
– Rodrigues 1915, doc. XLV.
32  Letter from John III to D. Manuel Mascarenhas, Évora, 17.VII.1545 
– Idem, doc. LIII.
33  Letter from John III to D. Manuel Mascarenhas, 1545 – Idem, doc. 
LXII.
34  Letter from D. Manuel Mascarenhas to John III, Arzila, 13.VI.1545 
– Idem, doc. LVI.
35  Menezes 1940: 80.
36  Lopes 1924: 385.
37  Letter from Francisco Botelho to John III, Tangier, 28.IV.1548 – 
Rodrigues 1915, doc. LXXXXXI/Menezes 1940: 81.
38  Lopes 1924: 386.
39  Fontoura 1998: 168.
40  Vila-Santa 2011: 49-57.
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At that time, D. Francisco warned John III that Arzila was 
weaker than Alcacer Ceguer and that the Saadids intended 
to siege it.41 In the wider context of the Saadids threat, who 
had conquered the Portuguese Agadir, in 1541, and forced 
King John III to abandon the Portuguese Safim and Azamor, 
the discussion in the court on other withdrawals restarted. 
Since the Realm lacked financial and military resources to 
maintain all the North African places alongside Brazil and 
India, the abandonment of Arzila and Alcacer Ceguer was 
debated as some stated that both places were military 
indefensible due to the lack of a port.42 It was in this context 
that John III, without consulting D. Francisco on the political 
decision of abandoning Arzila,43 probably because he knew 
he would oppose it, entrusted to his uncles D. João and D. 
Pedro Mascarenhas44 the delivery of a letter, asking for D. 
Francisco’s advice on how to military evacuate Arzila.45 
Since the Saadids’ threat continued in the summer of 
1549 and it became clear that the Seinal fortress could not 
prevent a siege to Arzila and Alcacer Ceguer, King John III 
appointed Luís Loureiro to evacuate Arzila and ordered D. 
Francisco to convince everyone to abandon it. The King 
promised compensations to D. Francisco’s house and to its 
inhabitants if they did not oppose his decision.46 Meanwhile, 
D. Pedro Mascarenhas suspended the abandonment since 
Muley Bouçon, brother of the defeated sultan of Fez, asked 
for the handover of Arzila and men to him in order to 
fight the Saadids. Since John III failed to convince Emperor 
Charles V to assist him, he confirmed the abandonment.47 
Thus, D. Francisco departed alongside his family, on August 
1549, from Arzila to Tangier. Muley Boaçon, who knew 
D. Francisco, witnessed his passage at Cadis on the way 
to Portugal, and tried to approach him concerning the 
withdrawal, but was not able to meet him. Still he became 
aware that D. Francisco fulfilled the royal orders, which 
motivated a thanking letter from the King.48
 Although, the abandonment had been ensured, that did 
not mean the royal decision to evacuate Arzila, which was 
followed by the withdrawal of Alcacer Ceguer, was accepted 
by all. In this sense, D. Francisco who lacked his father’s 
influence over the King on such an important royal decision 
since he had died on September 1548,49 was not the only 
one to disagree with the abandonment. Lourenço Pires de 
Távora, the Portuguese ambassador to Charles V, found 
John III’s decision on Arzila strange and had difficulties in 
explaining it to the Emperor since Arzila’s strategic position 
ensured that the Saadids would have at their disposal 
another port to launch naval attacks.50 However, the 
withdrawal of Arzila was a traumatic loss for D. Francisco 
and had to be compensated by royal mercies.
41  Andrade 1976, part IV, chap. XXXX.
42  Idem, parte IV, chap. XXXXI. 
43  Ditos…: 100.
44  Galvão 1946: 154-156.
45  Letter from John III to D. Francisco Coutinho, 4.VI.1549 - Biblioteca 
da Ajuda, cód. 49-IX-36, fl. 334.
46  Andrade 1976, parte IV, chap. XXXXI.
47  Idem, parte IV, chap. XXXXVIII.
48  Letter from John III to D. Francisco Coutinho, Lisboa, 2.VIII.1548 – 
Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal (BNP), cód. 1758, fl. 2.
49  Freire 1973: 383.
50  Fontoura 1998: 171.
2.  Between royal compensations and difficult challenges: 
D. Francisco’s courtesan career (1550-1560)
The process of compensation to the house of Redondo 
for the loss of Arzila is linked with those regarding the 
confirmations of D. Francisco’s title and properties since his 
father had died. On 14th October 1549 and at the request 
of D. Francisco’s mother, the countess D. Isabel Henriques, 
King John III confirmed the revenues in the custom-house of 
Lisbon.51 The confirmation of other properties went on from 
1551 to 1555.52 Amongst these was the most important one: 
the confirmation of D. Francisco as 3rd earl of Redondo. The 
process was not automatic since previously King John III had 
not confirmed all the noble titles depending on his personal 
evaluation. In the case of D. Francisco, his father’s services 
as well as his and the fact that he had the representation 
of the lineage of the Coutinhos, alongside his behaviour on 
the withdrawal of Arzila, explain why the King confirmed D. 
Francisco as 3rd earl of Redondo.
On 19th June 1549, when D. Francisco was still at Arzila, 
John III had already authorized D. Francisco to use the title 
since at this date he appointed him, due to his services in 
Africa, as badger of Salvador de Anciães, at the Christ Order, 
with the reference that he was already earl of Redondo.53 
But it was only on 23rd November 1549, when D. Francisco 
arrived from Arzila, that John III formally appointed him as 3rd 
earl of Redondo and confirmed his annuity.54 In an attempt to 
reward D. Francisco, in 1551,55 John III granted new judicial 
privileges to his villages and also ensured a pension of 30 
000 reais while D. Francisco was not appointed as badger 
of Vale de Reis, also at the Christ Order.56 However, the 
most important compensation to D. Francisco took place in 
1551 when the King established a pension of 300 000 reais, 
with the possibility of transmitting to D. Francisco’s heirs, 
and secretly donated the captaincy of Arzila to the house of 
Redondo whenever the city would be reconquered.
However, there are signs that this was not enough for 
D. Francisco’s ambition since the King’s secretary wrote 
as an answer to a request from him that “His Highness 
excused the others things you have asked and has entrusted 
me to tell you that in no way he would do more on this 
dispatch than what he had already did”. Furthermore, D. 
Francisco could only share the secret donation of Arzila 
with D. Dinis de Lencastre, his daughter’s husband, with D. 
Afonso de Portugal, 2nd earl of Vimioso, with D. Pedro de 
Almeida, with D. João and D. Pedro Mascarenhas.57 Most 
probably D. Francisco demanded compensation relating to 
the patrimony of the house of Marialva, which had been 
integrated in the Crown, specially the properties at Mindelo 
and Leomil, from whence the first Coutinhos descended,58 
51  Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo (ANTT), Chancelaria de D. João 
III (CDJIII), book 15, fl. 129v.
52  Idem, book 61, fls. 86, 89v., 90v., 92, 93, 94 and 102 and book 
54, fl. 299.
53  ANTT, CDJIII (Privilégios), book 2, fl. 220.
54  ANTT, CDJIII, book 61, fl 100v.
55  Idem, book 61, fls. 90v., 91v. and92. These privileges were enlar-
ged with others before the departure to India on 26th October 1560 
(ANTT, Chancelaria de D. Sebastião e D. Henrique, book 7, fl. 92).
56  The appointment took place on 6th March 1555 (ANTT, CDJIII, 
book 58, fl. 250).
57  Rodrigues 1915, docs. CXII and CXIII.
58  Oliveira 1999: 45 and 78.
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since in 1561 his relative, D. Lopo de Almeida, confirms that 
he was in Rome debating the issue with the Pope.59 Later 
on, Lourenço Pires de Távora, during his embassy at Rome, 
also took care of D. Francisco’s requests on the matter,60 
apparently without success.  
D. Francisco’s demands are also linked to his consciousness 
on the status he had in the court. This is confirmed by the 
fact that, in 1552, when Prince John married Princess D. 
Joana, D. Francisco presented to an annoyed Princess D. 
Joana, a Muslim that came from Morocco stating that since 
he could not be known as crusader against the Muslims, he 
preferred to present them.61 On July 1557, after King John 
III’s death, D. Francisco was at the reception of the French 
and Spanish ambassadors, as well as in 1559 when the new 
French ambassador arrived.62 It was also during this period 
that most probably D. Francisco married his heir, D. Luís 
Coutinho,63 to D. Leonor de Noronha, daughter of D. Aleixo 
de Meneses, King Sebastian’s chamberlain and his cousin.64
Taking into account that the Coutinhos from the house of 
Marialva used to be judicial officers, in the case “meirinhos-
mores”,65 the Regent Queen Catherine, in 1559, appointed 
D. Francisco as governor of the “Casa da Suplicação”, one 
of the Crown’s most important courts. He tried to resist the 
nomination but the Queen forced him and he replied: “Your 
Highness, since you want this, I will do what you order me 
but I remind you that the governor asked to be earl and being 
earl you made me governor”.66 It is possible that D. Francisco 
was asking to be promoted to marquis, something which did 
not happen. Succeeding D. João de Melo, D. Francisco had 
his first fire proof still in 1559. Queen Catherine ordered 
him to notify D. Teodósio, 5th duke of Braganza, and D. João 
de Lencastre, 1st duke of Aveiro and his relative since his 
sister and daughter both married D. João’s uncles, to exile 
from the court67 due to the non-authorized marriage of D. 
Teodósio with D. Brites de Lencastre.68 
This was a crucial mission since as a political supporter 
of D. João de Lencastre, who defended the end of Queen 
Catherine’s regency and the one of Cardinal Henry, D. 
Francisco was to be tested in his office. The fact that later 
on, D. Francisco was in 1560, appointed viceroy of India 
by Regent Queen Catherine, evidences that he was at the 
height of the Queen’s expectations on the case. Yet, this 
did not mean that the 3rd earl of Redondo forgot the loss of 
Arzila and did not continue to interfere in Morocco.69
In a consultation during King Sebastian’s reign of 
unknown date concerning the evolution of Morocco which 
had suffered several wars and the ottoman intervention,70 
59  Letter from D. Lopo de Almeida to King Sebastian, Rome, 
3.IV.1564 – ANTT, Corpo Cronológico (CC) I-104-95.
60  Cruz 1992, vol. II: 96.
61  Ditos…: 100.
62  Relações… 1937: 440-441 and 449-450.
63  Some letters from 1549 were sent to him by King John III relating 
the abandonment of Arzila (BNP, cód. 1758, fls. 13, 125 and 250).
64  Menezes 1730, part I, chap. XXIII.
65  Freire 1973: 410.
66  Ditos…: 102.
67  Cruz 1992, vol. I: 269.
68  For this polemics check: Vila-Santa 2018: 66-67.
69  In 1559 due to the Turkish threat to Ourão, D. Francisco helped 
the captain of Ceuta with his men (Vila-Santa 2011: 150).
70  Lugan 1992: 142.
D. Francisco reproved the abandonment decision. He 
sustained that Arzila did not have a bad port, stating that this 
was the argument of the ones who had never been there 
and concluded that King John III had been badly counseled 
to sacrifice Arzila instead of Mazagão. Despite the wrong 
decision he considered that the Moroccan wars showed that 
it would be easy to reconquer Arzila. Even acknowledging 
the financial difficulties to do so, he still defended that 
Arzila could be reconquered with less expenses and taking 
advantage of the wars in Morocco.71 Although the formal 
answer to this advice is unknown, it is sure that Arzila was 
not reconquered and that when it was again donated to the 
Portuguese Crown, in 1577, D. Francisco had already died. 
However, this did not mean that the trauma of losing Arzila, 
despite all the received compensations, was not still present 
and a valuable argument in the search for more rewards 
from the Crown. 
3.  Between great expectations and delusion: D. Francisco’s 
viceroyalty of India (1560-1564)
3.1. An unexpected and new scenario: the appointment for 
India (1560-1561)
On November 1560, the Queen Regent Catherine and 
Cardinal Henry were looking for a successor to viceroy D. 
Constantino de Braganza, half-brother of D. Teodósio, 5th 
duke of Braganza, who had been appointed in 1558. As 
Alexandra Pelúcia states, D. Constantino’s nomination 
was an extraordinary one since he had royal blood and 
was the most important nobleman to rule India without 
any knowledge of it. The orders given to him, in 1558, 
did not predict too many wars, although D. Constantino’s 
government became associated to the occupations at 
Daman and Ceylon and to the deepening of the Counter-
Reformist dynamics.72 For the Queen Regent who was aware 
that from India, D. Constantino tried to interfere in favour of 
D. Teodósio,73 it was clear that his successor had to be at the 
same social level. Moreover, since Lourenço Pires de Távora 
had warned that some officials in Portuguese Asia would 
like to proclaim D. Constantino as King and separate from 
Portugal, although he did not believe D. Constantino would 
do so, the concern about the next nominee was not small.74 
Since the hypothesis of appointing Tavóra was put 
aside and D. Francisco Coutinho was a quite respected 
nobleman due to his services in Morocco and in the court, 
and was earl and lord of one the most important houses 
of Portugal, he was perfectly suitable to succeed the royal-
blooded D. Constantino. It is also highly probable that for 
Queen Catherine the fact that D. Francisco was governor 
of the “Casa da Suplicação” meant his appointment would 
have a clear message for those in Portuguese Asia that 
dreamed of D. Constantino as King as well as a message 
for D. Constantino himself. In both cases, the message was 
clear: no autonomies would be accepted and D. Constantino 
would not have a pleasant reception at Portugal due to 
71  Consultation of D. Francisco Coutinho to King Sebastian – 
Rodrigues 1915, doc. CXIV.
72  Pelúcia 2018: 77-78.
73  Buescu 2007: 340.
74  Cruz 1992, vol. II: 89.
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his intervention in favour of D. Teodósio.75 Furthermore, 
D. Francisco’s personal connection to the rival house of 
Aveiro would also be a clear message to D. Constantino. All 
these facts explain the cold reception Coutinho gave to D. 
Constantino, once he reached Goa on 7th September 1561, 
aside his criticism on D. Constantino’s financial options.76
D. Francisco’s appointment had another huge advantage 
for the Regent: it diverted his house attention from an 
intervention in Morocco and from the topic of the royal 
compensations, in order to present him to a new scenario: 
the “Estado” where his uncle D. Fernando Coutinho, Marshall 
of Portugal, had, in 1509, been named to ensure the rule of 
governor Afonso de Albuquerque (1509-1515).77 Bearing in 
mind that D. Francisco did not give up his hope to recover 
Arzila, for the Regent, nothing would be better than to send 
to India a dangerous supporter of the return to Morocco 
at a moment close to the Courts of 1562 which demanded 
that return. Furthermore, the Regent was also trying to 
create a new focus of action for the house and it must not 
be forgotten that D. João Coutinho, 5th earl of Redondo and 
D. Francisco’s son, would also be named viceroy of India by 
King Philip II of Portugal (1598-1621), in 1617.78
The orders given to D. Francisco can be deduced from 
his only known letter written at Goa after three months of 
government. The main orders were similar to those given to 
D. Constantino, although D. Francisco was given reinforced 
orders on the financial and judicial fields due to his previous 
office.79 Thus, the Queen expected that he could order 
the “soldos”80 and the concession of “cartazes”,81 end the 
practice of selling offices, cut expenses and send to the 
Realm a list of them. D. Francisco also received orders not to 
sell weapons to Muslims and to end the private business at 
Chaul and Malindi.82 
As we shall check, D. Francisco tried to cut expenses, 
sent to the Realm the requested book of all expenses and 
of the “soldos” of the noblemen of India83 and this would 
be the basis for his successor, viceroy D. Antão de Noronha 
(1564-1568), to financially reform the fortresses.84 But D. 
Francisco’s departure was also marked by another event: 
the appointment of Sefer, by the Ottoman sultan Suleiman 
(1522-1566), as admiral of the ottoman fleet of the Indian 
Ocean.85 This appointment, in 1561, led to information that 
ottoman ships could attack from India to Mozambique,86 
and so Coutinho had to be prepared to fight ottomans at 
75  Vila-Santa 2014: 47-48.
76  Letter from D. Francisco Coutinho to King Sebastian, Goa, 
20.XII.1561 – “Duas…” 1959: 46.
77  In an assault to Calicut, after fulfilling the orders of King Manuel 
I to force viceroy D. Francisco de Almeida to hand over the government 
to governor Albuquerque.
78  Rodrigues 2004: 180.
79  Vila-Santa 2014: 48.
80  Salaries payed by the Crown to the soldiers.
81  System created by the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean in which 
only the ships with licence (“cartaz”) were allowed to trade.
82  Letter from D. Francisco Coutinho to King Sebastian, Goa, 
20.XII.1561 – “Duas…” 1959: 49, 56-59, 63 and 66-67.
83  Santos 1999: 160.
84  Vila-Santa 2010: 86-87.
85  Casale 2010: 110.
86  Letter from Luís de Melo da Silva to D. Fernando de Menezes, 
Hormuz, 15.VIII.1561 – ANTT, CC I-105-19.
his arrival at Mozambique.87 This fact also explains why D. 
Francisco left Lisbon with five ships, crowded of men88 who 
wanted to fight under the rule of a respected commander, 
and as soon as 15th March 1561. 
Although, D. Francisco did not find any ottomans at 
Mozambique, he faced some problems in the voyage and 
Francisco Figueira de Azevedo ensured the navigational success 
of the fleet.89 Fulfilling his orders, once he reached Goa, D. 
Francisco started his government with a judicial action: that of 
trying to imprison Gonçalo Feio who had challenged Francisco 
Barreto, previous governor of India. Despite his failure in 
catching Feio,90 Coutinho was expected, by the noblemen of 
India, due to his career and reputation, to be not only a mere 
successor of the royal-blooded D. Constantino, but also to 
rival him in terms of military achievements. Furthermore, D. 
Francisco became known as the “earl viceroy”, as he signed on 
his letter, in a clear intention to compare himself to viceroy D. 
Vasco da Gama, 1st earl of Vidigueira, who had been appointed 
in 1524 and who, contrary to D. Francisco, already knew very 
well India at his arrival.
3.2.  The political and military events: Portrays of success or 
shadows of failure?
D. Francisco’s government dealt with several challenges 
which need to be studied in order to understand whether 
the “earl viceroy” did or did not fulfill the expectations 
over his appointment. His main areas of intervention were: 
Mozambique and the polemics on the intervention at 
Mutapa; the peace attempt with the Ottoman Empire and 
the delay on the Ethiopian affairs; the worsening of the 
situation at Malabar; the sieges at Ceylon; the delays on 
both Melaka and Ternate; and finally, the embassy to China.
The first topic D. Francisco dealt with was the Mutapian 
Empire. On his arrival at Mozambique, he found the “land 
revolted” due to the destruction of a mosque and arranged 
a meeting with its captain, Pantaleão de Sá, in order to 
discuss the works in the fortress which were late and 
costing too much. The viceroy even sent a new design of 
the fortress to the King and also had to calm down a Muslim 
ambassador that came to apologize for Father D. Gonçalo 
da Silveira’s murder, on March 1561, at the Mutapian court. 
The ambassadorwas worried that Francisco Barreto would 
be named to conquer the land. Despite, D. Francisco replied 
that did not make sense,91 the truth is that he regretted 
Silveira’s death due to their kinship, thought of vengeance 
but did not proceed since he lacked the conditions. He also 
made an “auto” for the King with all the information on 
the case.92 Later on, D. Francisco agreed93 with the Jesuits 
87  Letter from father Francisco de Pina to his brothers of Portugal, 
Goa, 4.XI.1561 – Documenta Indica (DI), vol. V, 1958, doc. 34; Letter from 
father João Baptista do Monte to father Miguel Torres, Goa, 12.XII.1561 
– Idem, doc. 53.
88  Letter from father João Baptista do Monte to father Miguel 
Torres, Goa, 12.XII.1561 – Idem, doc. 53.
89  Report on the voyage of 1561 – Idem, doc. 59.
90  Couto 1974, VII, x, 1.
91  Letter from D. Francisco Coutinho to King Sebastian, Goa, 
20.XII.1561 – “Duas…” 1959: 41-45.
92  Report on the voyage of 1561 – DI, vol. V, doc. 59.
93  Letter from father Luís de Fróis to his brothers of Portugal, Goa, 
15.XII.1561 – Idem, doc. 54.
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discussion on the chances of sending more priests there 
and sent an embassy to Mutapa which failed.94 He, then, 
decided not to intervene anymore probably considering the 
powers given by the King, in 1562,95 to the new captain of 
Sofala and Mozambique, and also the royal orders not to 
send more priests since the land was to be conquered by an 
expedition coming from Portugal.96 Despite the unclearness 
of D. Francisco’s position, we think that he intended to 
force an embassy or the dispatch of priests to the region 
but found he lacked the conditions to do so due to other 
agenda issues. 
One of these, and of the utmost importance, was the 
relationship with the Ottoman Empire. After the fear of 
finding ottomans at Mozambique, D. Francisco was aware 
than an emissary sent from the governor of Basra was 
coming to India to ask for peace. At the beginning, the viceroy 
did not find a good idea to sign it, although he promised 
to submit the final decision to Portugal.97 However, there 
are good reasons to believe he changed his mind. When he 
was informed that the ottoman admiral Sefer could attack 
Portuguese merchant ships sailing from Hormuz to Goa, 
he sent D. Francisco Mascarenhas, a nephew who came to 
India with him named as captain of the sea of India, with a 
huge fleet to fight Sefer. But Mascarenhas delayed at Diu 
and Bazaim and Sefer escaped. Later on, the viceroy sent 
Jorge de Moura with another fleet. Moura fought with 
Acehnese ships near the Red Sea, but failed again to catch 
Sefer.98 These events gave fresh impetus on the reanimation 
of the Islamic commercial routes that competed with the 
Portuguese ones and were perceived as strategic defeats.99
Due to this situation, on November 1562, the viceroy 
resisted in appointing a new captain for Hormuz and decided 
to send António de Azevedo to Istambul to negotiate a peace 
treaty with the Ottomans.100 Meanwhile, an Italian named 
Cuccino had been sent from Rome, by Lourenço Pires de 
Távora, to negotiate, on behalf of the King of Portugal, 
the peace with sultan Suleiman. The Ottomans offered 
the Portuguese the chance of establishing trade posts at 
Basra and Cairo and demanded in exchange trade posts at 
Hormuz, Diu and Goa.101 The faction at Suleiman’s court 
that supported an investment in the Indian Ocean was at 
the height of its power, being able to appoint the governor 
of Basra who sent the first emissary, naming a new vizier 
favorable to this policy and convincing the sultan of the 
benefits of the peace. This had been the best proposition 
of peace ever to be made by the Ottomans to Portugal.102 
Ambassador António de Azevedo and Cuccino met at 
Istambul, thus causing confusion, and sultan Suleiman sent 
letters to Lisbon and Goa in order to confirm the peace. 
  94  Letter from father António de Quadros to father Jaime Lainez, 
Cochin, 18.I.1563 – Idem, doc. 111.
  95  Rivara, J. H., 1992, fascículo 5, parte 2, docs. 397-399 and 
410-414.
  96  Letter from father João de Polanco to father António de Quadros, 
Trent, 4.XII.1563 – DI, vol. VI, doc. 13.
  97  Letter from D. Francisco Coutinho to King Sebastian, Goa, 
20.XII.1561 – “Duas…”, 1959, 49-54.
  98  Couto 1974, VII: x, 3.
  99  Casale 2010: 112.
100  Couto 1974, VII: x, 7.
101  Subrahmanyam 2012: 167.
102  Casale 2010: 113-114.
In spite of the pressure from the royal family of 
Hormuz103 to sign it, the defenders of the risks of an ottoman 
commercial expansion in the Indian Ocean prevailed both 
at Lisbon and Goa while sultan Suleiman died in 1566, 
causing the peace to fail.104 But it is important to stress that 
during the negotiations a status quo of non-intervention, 
previous to the battle of Talikota in 1565, had been reached 
between the Ottomans and the Portuguese, which led the 
first to give up sailing to the Indian Ocean while the second 
did not intervene in the Red Sea.105 This explains why D. 
Francisco evolved from his initial position and, mainly, why 
he did not interfere in the Ethiopian affairs despite of the 
wars in 1562-1563, with the Ottomans proclaiming a new 
emperor and defeating the legitimate one.106 Pressured to 
send 1000 men, the viceroy declined the request when he 
became aware, in the sequence of the defeat against the 
Ottomans, that the Ethiopian emperor refused obedience 
to Rome. Father Belchior Barreto stated that “I have fear of 
his reprehension since I am messing in orders that were not 
given to me”.107 Even when Coutinho was threatened by the 
royal ambassador Fernão de Sousa, with letters to Queen 
Catherine and Cardinal Henry about not assisting Ethiopia, 
he did not give up his point108 that sending an expedition to 
Ethiopia would reopen war with the Ottomans.
 At stake were also other problems he faced when 
he arrived Goa. The first one was the embassy from 
Ahmadnagar, demanding more “cartazes”, when he was 
informed that the sultan had sent an embassy to Istambul 
asking for a fleet to conquer Chaul. D. Francisco refused the 
request and, worried about Chaul, counseled the Crown to 
reinforce it, by conquering to Ahmadnagar the “morro” in 
order to fortify and defend the city, or to abandon it. Further 
worries were also placed at Goa since the ambassador from 
Bijapur claimed for the restitution of Bârdez and Salsete but 
D. Francisco managed, with a reception at night, to become 
his friend and convinced him to give up such demands. 
Concerning Gujarat, which was in internal division, D. 
Francisco did not support the idea of conquering the 
sultanate and was favourable to sign peace with its sultan 
and not with his favourites, although he did not oppose 
wagging war with the lord of Surrat.109 His concern was also 
at Daman, conquered by D. Constantino, who lacked military 
safety. On this issue, the viceroy’s trust in the new captain, 
Garcia Rodrigues de Távora, who successfully defeated 
the nearby invader abexins,110 ensured that he was seen 
as a prosecutor of D. Constantino’s policy in the region.111 
Although some regretted that he did not visit Daman 
because if he did he would have conquered its lands due to 
103  Letter from Reis Nordim to King Sebastian, Hormuz, 25.V.1564 
– ANTT, CC I-106-136,
104  Subrahmanyam 2012: 167.
105  Thomaz 1995: 484.
106  Couto 1974, VII: x, 4 and 6.
107  Letter from father Belchior Nunes Barreto to Rome, Goa, 
30.XI.1562 – DI, vol. V, doc. 84, 566.
108  Letter from father Belchior Nunes Barreto to father Jaime 
Lainez, Cochin, 24.I.1563 – Idem, doc. 113.
109  Letter from D. Francisco Coutinho to King Sebastian, Goa, 
20.XII.1561 – “Duas” 1959: 52-55.
110  Couto 1974, VII: x, 7-8.
111  Mendiratta 2012: 268.
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his experience at Arzila,112 the truth is that D. Francisco was 
worried with the evolution at Malabar since it became the 
key-point area during his government.
Due to the growing difficulty in supplying pepper for 
Portugal, a problem that had been initiated on the 1550’s 
due to the wars between Calicut and Cochin in the interior 
Malabar, D. Francisco promised to have always a strong fleet 
there and to force, in spite of the lack of money, Calicut 
to sell him pepper.113 This explains why he arranged the 
biggest expedition that India had ever seen to sign peace 
with Calicut.114 On December 1562, supplied with 3000 
soldiers from Portugal, D. Francisco departed from Goa with 
4000 men and 140 ships in order to meet Manavikrama 
of Calicut (1562-1574) and sign the peace. On his way to 
Tiracole, the noblemen found strange his attitude of not 
punishing the rajah of Cananor, accused of illegal trade and 
held responsible for the lack of pepper. Instead, the viceroy 
chose to organize a military ceremony with his ships firing 
while he disembarked his 4000 men to meet 40 000 men, 
thus succeeding in intimidating Calicut. After this event, D. 
Francisco went to Cochin to load the pepper.115 
At Cochin, the noblemen who had wanted war attacked 
each other, causing the death of 50 men, meanwhile the 
Muslims of Cochin killed the city’s governor, named by the 
rajah of Cochin, causing several disorders that D. Francisco 
was unable to stop. Instead, it was the intervention of the 
bishop D. Jorge Temudo and of Father Belchior Barreto 
responsible for reinstating order.116 Not even the appointment 
of D. Jorge de Castro, by the viceroy, in fulfillment of royal 
orders, as captain of Cochin to deal with peppers loadings 
would be enough. Not only the viceroy authority had been 
damaged with the incidents, but worse, Castro denounced 
the difficulties in loading the pepper and even suggested to 
Cardinal Henry that he should seriously consider delivering 
the responsibility to private merchants.117 All these facts, 
explain why the loaded pepper would not be enough for 
Lisbon’s demands during D. Francisco’s viceroyalty.
Aware of these facts and concerned that the Muslims 
displayed a growing slight towards the Portuguese, when 
the viceroy was informed that captain Jerónimo Dias de 
Meneses fought with several ships without “cartazes” that 
he suspected had been sent from Calicut, he ordered D. 
Jorge de Castro to confront the rajah. Since the rajah’s reply, 
that he was not aware of those sea thief’s and that he could 
arrest them, angered him, he decided to appoint Domingos 
Mesquita, to attack 80 ships with “cartazes”, that would sail 
North in the beginning of 1564, in order to check Calicut’s 
reaction. Mesquita not only sank 20 of these 80 ships but he 
also killed in cruel ways every Muslim he found. Some days 
later, the viceroy died at Goa.118 
112  Couto 2001: 531-532.
113  Letter from D. Francisco Coutinho to King Sebastian, Goa, 
20.XII.1561 – “Duas…” 1959: 46-50.
114  Some state this expedition marks the height of the Portuguese 
power in India (Monteiro 1992, vol. III: 237).
115  Couto 1974, VII: x, 7 and 9.
116  Letter from the Cochin Chamber to Cardinal Henry, Cochin, 
29.XII.1563 – ANTT, CC I-106-103.
117  Letter from D. Jorge de Castro to Cardinal Henry, Cochin, 
24.I.1563 – ANTT, CC I-106-32.
118  Couto 1974, VII: x, 17.
If for the Muslims, the wars against the Portuguese 
due to commercial and religious motivations had not been 
solved in 1556,119 the same happened in 1562.120 The fact 
that D. Francisco, who once had said he did not come to 
India to rule for the Muslims,121 hastened the reopening 
of the war due to the commands he gave to Domingos 
Mesquita, affected directly his ability to intervene in others 
areas such as Ceylon. Not even the sieges to Kotte and 
Colombus, launched by the enemy King of Sitawaka, were 
enough to catch the attention of the viceroy since both 
sieges were resolved, without his assistance, by captain 
Baltasar Guedes de Sousa.122 D. Francisco was expected 
to continue D. Constantino’s policy at Jafanapatão too,123 
but he refused to conquer it, since in 1561, he had already 
considered that Ceylon was not suitable for investment due 
to the lack of defenses and the financial expenses.124 Thus, 
when bishop D. Jorge Temudo pressured him once more to 
conquer Jafanapatão, he delayed the decision125 and only 
sent a Franciscan priest to the kingdom of Kandy.126 
The same impossibility of intervention happened at 
Melaka where, after the peace treaty with Calicut, D. 
Francisco wrote to its captain, to await him on October 
1563 in order to conquer Aceh. Despite having spent the 
whole year of 1563 preparing for the journey, the viceroy 
did not depart apparently due to the need to spare ships 
to send pepper to Portugal.127 The works in the fortress of 
Melaka that D. Francisco ordered to be done had also been 
stopped at his orders due to the lack of money.128 Regarding 
Ternate, there is evidence that he sent captain Henrique 
de Sá, on September 1561, with orders to assist the sieged 
Christians at Ambon,129 in accordance with a local project 
of expansion.130 Although a year later he was accused 
of trying to avoid sending Sá because he did not want to 
assist Ambon,131 it is probable that he intended to support 
further expansion at Ambon against the strategic enemy, 
sultan Hairun of Ternate (1545-1571), since this sultan, on 
February 1564, made a donation of his Realm to Portugal, 
fearing a huge goese intervention.132 But, Coutinho’s death 
stopped his plans.
Finally, another area where D. Francisco’s action was 
expected concerned the envoy of an embassy to the new 
emperor of China. For this purpose, he had brought from 
Portugal a special gift and orders to appoint Diogo Pereira 
as captain of Macau or ambassador.133 He sent Diogo Pereira 
119  Bouchon 1999: 284.
120  História… 1998, part IV, chap. XI.
121  Ditos…: 102.
122  Couto 1974, VII: x, 15-16.
123  Vallignano 1944, part II, chap. 13.
124  Letter from D. Francisco Coutinho to King Sebastian, Goa, 
20.XII.1561 – “Duas…” 1959: 47.
125  Letter from father António de Quadros to father Jaime Lainez, 
Cochin, 18.I.1563 – DI, vol. V, doc. 111.
126  Trindade 1962, chap. 25.
127  Couto 1974, VII, x, 15.
128  Letter from the Melaka Chamber to Queen Catherine, Melaka, 
27.III.1563 – ANTT, CC I-106-64.
129  Couto 1974, VII, x, 1.
130  Lobato 1999: 113.
131  Letter from father Baltasar da Costa to his brothers, Goa, 
4.XII.1562 – DI, vol. VI, doc. 88.
132  Lobato 1999: 110-111.
133  Sousa 1978: 650.
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to China on April 1562,134 after considering sending Father 
António de Quadros, the Jesuit provincial of India.135 Pereira 
arrived at Macau on August 1562 and decided to be captain 
instead of ambassador while the viceroy received order, 
in 1562, to name Gil de Góis, Pereira’s brother in law, as 
ambassador. When Góis finally reached Macau, on April 
1563, the Chinese authorities refused access to the Emperor 
since they considered the gift too modest and he was a born 
indo-portuguese. Thus, only in 1564 the first Jesuits arrived 
at Canton,136 after D. Francisco’s death, which means that in 
this area, contrary to what happened with the missionary 
successes in Japan during his government, the viceroy again 
lacked results. 
We can conclude that military and politically, Coutinho’s 
viceroyalty was far from being comparable to the successes 
of his ancestor D. Constantino, despite these had been an 
important criterion for his appointment. The consequences 
of the delusion of his military government were very 
clear in the incidents at Cochin, in 1563. This explains the 
delusion of the noblemen with his government and should 
not be disconnected from Coutinho’s position towards the 
Counter-Reform policies.
3.3.  “Do not take me for an Erasmus”: D. Francisco and the 
Counter-Reformist policies 
In order to understand why D. Francisco wrote to the King, 
in 1561, that he did not want to be taken for an Erasmus it is 
crucial to go back to the appointment of the first archbishop 
of Goa, D. Gaspar de Leão Pereira, in 1560, who, for a long 
time, was one of Coutinho’s allies. Thus, to reason out this 
alliance, it is important to study the personal motivation of 
D. Gaspar who was himself an important figure. 
His appointment happened after the first judicial 
process (the “devassa”) against the Jews and New-Christians 
of Cochin and Goa in 1557,137 which governor Francisco 
Barreto had tried to oppose,138 as well as the escape, 
during several years, of these communities from Portugal to 
India.139 Being chaplain and preacher of Cardinal Henry,140 D. 
Gaspar belonged to the spiritual circle of Cardinal Henry141 
and had important connections with the Franciscans and to 
Father Luís de Granada.142 Thus, D. Gaspar was a respected 
confident of Cardinal Henry and the 1550 decade had 
proved that a religious authority was needed at Goa, due 
to the death of the previous bishop D. Juan de Albuquerque 
in 1553. In order to solve the many issues without having 
to wait for an answer from Lisbon,143 Cardinal Henry and 
the Pope forced D. Gaspar to accept the appointment as 
first archbishop of Goa.144 D. Gaspar failed to resist the 
134  Loureiro 2000: 556-557.
135  Letter from father Manuel Teixera to father Marco Nunes, 
Bazaim, 4.XII.1561 – DI, vol. V, doc. 49.
136  Loureiro 2000: 558-559.
137  Faria 2009: 145-146.
138  Vila-Santa 2017: 210-213.
139  Marcocci 2012: 387.
140  Xavier 2014: 145-146.
141  Ventura 2005: 26-27.
142  Xavier 2014: 135-137.
143  Ventura 2005, vol. I: 43-44.
144  Arienzo 1987; Faria 2009: 149.
nomination.145 In fact, his critics would state that the Crown 
had appointed a contemplative to such an important 
executive office.
Nevertheless, D. Gaspar departed for India with 
reinforced powers and with a clear centralized project,146 
facing the challenge to rule over a huge dioceses’ and to 
convert a demographic majority of non-Christians while 
implementing Counter-Reformation.147 This occurred 
because there were several attempts to apply the decisions 
of the Council of Trent in Portugal even before it had 
finished in 1563, and Portugal became “avant-garde” in 
Europe.148 Arriving to India, in 1560, during D. Constantino’s 
government, D. Gaspar involved in polemics with the 
Jesuits. Although, he had a project to convert every religious 
majority, from Hindus to Muslims, to Jews and New-
Christians, he was confronted by D. Constantino’s policy to 
rapidly convert Goa into a Christian island.149
Thus, in 1560, having been invited by the Jesuits to baptize 
several Hindus at their College in Goa, D. Gaspar “mourned 
that the humility that had characterized the first Jesuits had 
been lost”, criticized the excessive apparatus and ordered the 
Jesuits not to interfere anymore with the baptisms that were 
under his jurisdiction. The effects of the conflict rapidly spread 
with the Jesuits accusing D. Gaspar of being responsible for 
a slowdown in the baptisms.150 This occurred because D. 
Gaspar became aware that in previous years huge numbers 
of people were baptized without being properly catechized 
and that forced baptisms were made when Father António 
de Quadros, the Jesuit Provincial of India, Father Belchior 
Carneiro and the theologian Francisco Rodrigues, with the 
support of viceroy D. Constantino, had been visiting all the 
houses of the Hindus in Goa ordering them to baptize and 
imprisoning those who did not accept it.151
Defending a policy of sincere baptisms,152 clear catechisms 
and opposing what he interpreted as forced conversions, D. 
Gaspar was supported by the Jesuit Provincial of Portugal in 
his stand.153 However, at Ceylon, in 1561, he forced viceroy 
D. Constantino to destroy a Buddhist relic by denying 
the money offered by the King of Pegu for it and arguing 
that it was important to destroy pagan relics.154 Thus, his 
attitude at Ceylon provided him enemies. Although, he was 
satisfied that the Jesuits obeyed him155 and even wrote to 
the King of Portugal that he still intended to convert Goa 
but with different methods,156 the truth is that this conflict 
also had consequences for the Jesuits in Asia who did not 
145  Ventura 2005, vol. I: 43-47.
146  Idem, vol. I: 47 and 52-53.
147  Xavier 2014: 140.
148  Polónia 2014: 48.
149  Marcocci 2012: 392.
150  Letter from Belchior Nunes Barreto to father Jaime Lainez, 
Cochin, 15.I.1562 – DI, vol. V, doc. 69.
151  Letter from father António de Herédia, Lisbon, XI.1561? – DI, 
vol. V, doc. 31.
152  Paiva 2014, 31.
153  Letter from father Miguel de Torres to father Jaime Lainez, 
Lisbon, 17.VI.1561 – Idem, doc. 28. 
154  Ventura 2005, vol. I: 62.
155  Letter from D. Gaspar de Leão Pereira to father Miguel de Torres, 
16.XI.1561 – DI, vol. V, doc. 35.
156  Letter from D. Gaspar de Leão Pereira to King Sebastian, Goa. 
20.XI.1561 – Idem, doc. 35A.
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accept this peacefully.157 As a consequence, Father António 
de Quadros intended to dismiss himself from the office of 
Jesuit Provincial of India158 and counsels were made for new 
authorized Jesuits to be sent from Portugal.159 
Arriving in the middle of these events, D. Francisco agreed 
with D. Gaspar and his theologians that D. Constantino’s 
law on the expulsion of Brahmins should be reversed. He 
cancelled it, on 3rd December 1561, arguing with the fear 
of a depopulated Goa.160 Moreover, during that month, D. 
Francisco wrote to the King that in a visit at Goa “behind 
the Hindus that were there I rectified some things that had 
been badly done and promised to do others”. Furthermore, 
he mentioned that he favoured all the Christians as the King 
had ordered him but also that he decided to ignore the 
Christians who escaped to Muslim territories, stating that 
“Your Highness will have to forgive me for this but do not 
take me for an Erasmus because I do not do more to them 
than to cover my eyes and nose”. Furthermore, at a time 
when the boundary between faith and religious crime was 
too tenuous,161 he promised to forgive the Christians who 
wanted to return and defended that, as Father Francisco de 
Pina had done with two black men at Mozambique, refusing 
to baptize them without catechizing them first, “these are 
the Christians I tell Your Highness that I want”. He also 
added that he would support the priests with the same 
vision as his, ended up warning that “I shall forgive those 
who will complain about me” and ensured that D. Gaspar 
“serves very well his office and is fulfilling the royal orders” 
and that the King should not “believe in anyone that tells 
you the opposite”.162
The alliance of D. Francisco with the archbishop was 
crystal clear. Since his arrival, the viceroy supported D. 
Gaspar against the Jesuits and promised to continue to do 
so. But why did he take this stand? It is possible that he had 
already met D. Gaspar in Portugal but we think that in the 
basis of this political and religious alliance with him are two 
aspects: both shared the same vision concerning baptisms 
and devotion and were clear supporters of the Franciscans. 
As we have seen D. Gaspar had connections with them and 
D. Francisco also preferred them and this explains why he 
ordered in his testament to be buried in the goese Franciscan 
church163 with their habit alongside the Christ Order one. 
Although the viceroy shared the same spiritual 
orientation, it is impossible to deny his close relationship to 
his Jesuit confessor, Father Francisco de Pina, who ensured 
that he “prayed with such a devotion that he made me more 
devote” and that he forced him to a second confession 
before entering Goa “looking like he entered not as ruler but 
as a dying pious man”.164 Moreover, he also granted his good 
157  Vallignano 1944, part II, chap. 15.
158  Letter from father António de Quadros to father Jaime Lainez, 
Bazaim, 28.XI.1561 – Idem, doc. 38.
159  Letter from father António de Herédia, Lisbon, XI.1561? – DI, 
vol. V, doc. 31.
160  Rivara 1992, doc. 391.
161  Marcocci 2012: 400.
162  Letter from D. Francisco Coutinho to King Sebastian, Goa, 
20.XII.1561 – “Duas…” 1959: 52, 60, 62, 64-65 and 67.
163  Trindade 1962, chap. 71. This chronicler also mentions his regu-
lar visits.
164  Letter from father Francisco de Pina to his brothers, Goa, 
4.XI.1561 – DI, vol. V, doc. 34, p. 216, 222.
relations with the Jesuits.165 But, ever since D. Francisco 
supported D. Gaspar, those facts changed since the Jesuits 
continued to accuse D. Gaspar of slowing down the rhythm 
of baptisms.166  
Their influence near the courts of Lisbon and Rome 
explains the letter from the King to D. Gaspar reminding him 
that all the previous rulers had been zealous in baptisms 
and that he had ordered D. Constantino to remove all the 
obstacles to conversions and so he did not need to remind 
him of his obligations and still trusted that he would do the 
best.167 On the same date, the King wrote to D. Francisco 
ordering him to counsel with D. Gaspar and the Jesuits in 
order to establish the strategy for the new baptized and 
asking for annual reports on the numbers of baptisms.168 
The King also wrote to the Chamber of Goa asking the 
same.169 Meanwhile, the Jesuit Provincial of Portugal 
awaited instructions from Rome on the matter.170
Once this letter was received by D. Gaspar, he called the 
Jesuits and confessing himself betrayed by the men who had 
convinced him to support the Hindus, authorized the Jesuits 
to restart the baptisms while Father Francisco Rodrigues and 
the captain of Goa were authorized to advertise everyone, 
on behalf of the King, of his letter to the Non-Christians of 
Goa.171 Although, D. Gaspar had been defeated and had 
to place his obedience above his personal opinion, which 
later on had consequences on his resignation of the office 
in 1567,172 Coutinho tried to maintain the same policy. In 
the meantime, from Trent, orders were given for a letter to 
be written by the Pope to D. Gaspar on the topic.173 Cardinal 
Henry was also asked to address a letter to D. Gaspar on 
the same thematic and the resignation of Father António 
de Quadros was refused.174 Rome was also aware that 
Coutinho was not alike D. Constantino and managed to send 
him letters from the King of Portugal and the Pope.175
Meanwhile, at Goa, the viceroy attended another small 
baptism176 and imprisoned the previous captain of Goa, for 
opposing his intention to reverse D. Constantino’s policy.177 
Actually, D. Francisco received a letter from the King ordering 
him not to allow the entrance of Jews from the Middle East 
in the “Estado” and to meet with D. Gaspar, the bishop of 
165  Letter from father João Baptista do Monte to father Miguel de 
Torres, Goa, 12.XII.1561 – Idem, doc. 53.
166  Letter from father Belchior Nunes Barreto to father Jaime 
Lainez, Cochin, 15.I.1562 – Idem, doc. 69.
167  Letter from King Sebastian to D. Gaspar de Leão Pereira, Lisbon, 
11.III.1562 – PUB. Idem, doc. 72A.
168  Letter from King Sebastian to D. Francisco Coutinho, Lisbon, 
11.III.1562 – Idem, doc. 72B.
169  Letter from King Sebastian to the Chamber of Goa, Lisbon, 
11.III.1562 – Idem, doc. 72C.
170  Letter from father Gonçalo Vaz to father Jaime Lainez, Braga, 
25.VIII.1562 – Idem, doc. 75.
171  Machado 1736, tomo II, book I, chap. XV.
172  Ventura 2005, vol. I: 52 and 60; Marcocci 2012: 398.
173  Letter from father João de Polanco to father Baptista Rivera, 
Trent, 12.XI.1562 – DI, vol. V, doc. 81.
174  Letter from father João de Polanco to father Gonçalo Vaz de 
Melo, Trent, 7.XII.1562 – Idem, doc. 92.
175  Letter from father Jaime Lainez to father Francisco Rodrigues, 
Trent, 11.XII.1562 – Idem, doc. 93.
176  Letter from father Baltasar da Costa to his brothers, Goa, 
4.XII.1562 – Idem, doc. 88.
177  Letter of D. Pero de Meneses to King Sebastian, Goa, 30.XII.1562 
– ANTT, CC I-89-42.
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Cochin, and the Jesuits in order to discuss the orders of 
King John III not to favour Brahmins and to encourage new 
baptisms.178 On that sequence, the viceroy assisted the 
Jesuits arriving from Portugal on September 1563179 but 
delayed, without explanation, the implementation of this 
order until November. Only then he gathered D. Gaspar, the 
other religious authorities, the Chamber of Goa and other 
officials, and after the preach from D. Gaspar against the 
Brahmins, he promised to adopt measures in favour of the 
Christianity, attending with all the noblemen of India to a 
mass baptism. Still he imposed that it would be the judicial 
officers to spread the news at Goa and not the religious 
authorities.180 This was done by a special provision from D. 
Francisco on 27th November 1563 that nullified his previous 
one, dated back 1561.181
In this sequence the political defense of viceroy D. 
Constantino’s memory was again possible182 and the 
majority recognized that the letter from the Pope to D. 
Gaspar had been useless.183 But, regarding D. Francisco, 
could the same be stated? Bearing in mind that he resisted 
to apply the royal orders until the last moment, from 1562 
to the end of 1563, we think that the Pope’s letter, despite 
being unknown, was necessary. Still, this outcome for D. 
Gaspar and D. Francisco on the Counter-Reformist policies 
should not be disconnected from the beginning of the 
regency of Cardinal Henry.184 
While governor Francisco Barreto opposed the “devassa” 
of 1557 and tried to protect the New-Christian and Hindu 
communities due to his sense of the strategic interests of 
the “Estado”,185 Coutinho seems to have opposed a full 
implementation of Counter-Reformation in Asia due to 
his personal convictions. At the time of Francisco Barreto 
there was no Inquisition and no archbishop of Goa. On the 
contrary, in the case of D. Francisco, this only detaches his 
opposition to the implementation of a full Counter-Reformist 
policy and raises the question on his motivation. As a great 
aristocrat, still embodied with the spirit of Renaissance, and 
despite his political defeat, Coutinho did not give up his 
view as his patronage clearly evidences. 
3.4.  The patron of culture: D. Francisco, Garcia de Orta and 
Luís de Camões
During his government, the 3rd earl of Redondo detached 
himself from other governors and viceroys of India due to 
his known patronage. Since D. Francisco’s patronage in India 
is linked with the cultural ambience and political thought of 
the late Renaissance,186 this aspect needs further analysis 
178  Letter from King Sebastian to D. Francisco Coutinho, Lisbon, 
6.III.1563 – DI, vol. VI, doc. 4A.
179  Letter from father Jaime de Braga to father Miguel de Torres, 
Goa, 2.XII.1563 – Idem, doc. 11.
180  Letter from father Lourenço Peres to his brothers of Portugal, 
Goa, 17.XII.1563 – Idem, doc. 24.
181  Rivara 1992, doc. 472.
182  Letter from father Emanuel Cabral to father Luís Gonçalves da 
Câmara, Hormuz, 10.IV.1564 – DI, vol. VI, doc. 33.
183  Letter from father António de Quadros to father Jaime Lainez, 
Goa, 8.XII.1563 – Idem, doc. 15.
184  Marcocci 2012: 386.
185  Vila-Santa 2017: 210-213.
186  Skinner 1996 and Pocock 1997.
If in the case of Garcia de Orta, it must be stressed that his 
support was given to an important person, in the case of 
Camões, D. Francisco became responsible for patronizing 
a poet who had not yet achieved recognition for his work. 
Having the reputation in Portugal to be playful, D. Francisco 
maintained this attitude in India.187 Thus, it is known that 
he used to play sports, although his health did not help, 
betting money, despite his nephew’s advices not to do so, 
since he used to lose.188 But, D. Francisco’s love for arts had 
deep seeds. Already in 1560, Duarte Nunes de Leão, an 
officer from the “Casa da Suplicação”, had dedicated him 
his book, arguing on D. Francisco’s high valor as a military 
commander as well as an exemplar top judicial officer and 
man of culture.189 On this sense it is not surprising to find 
that he departed to India with several musicians and used 
to sing.190
 If all these facts point to his cultural interests, his relation 
with Camões proves it even better. At a time when Camões 
was a poet-soldier, had not yet published the Lusíadas and 
had to fight for his recognition as a poet amongst other 
candidates, he sought D. Francisco’s protection aware of his 
influence and love for culture. Thus, he started by dedicating 
a poem to the viceroy begging for his protection against a 
feared soldier of India.191 Probably in reply to this request, 
D. Francisco sent another poem to Camões censuring his 
previous option of having the earls of Linhares patronizing 
him.192 But specialists consider that after this Coutinho 
accepted Camões offer to sing his deeds.193 
On his first poem, Camões started by saying that D. 
Francisco “deserves the name of King”, since the office of 
viceroy was too low for him and praised his fame as well 
that of his antecessors to end up with the promise to be his 
faithful ally in reporting in poetry all his military successes. 
In another poem, Camões provoked his playful side but also 
mentioned his wealth and reputation as a man of justice.194 
The poet also dedicated a poem to his father, although this 
was not as eulogistic as those dedicated to the son.195 
Due to the close relation Camões developed with the 
viceroy, he was able to help his friend, the physician Garcia 
de Orta, on his attempt to publish his book about medicine. 
Although, Orta, in spite of his father’s Jewish origin, had 
gathered the support of several rulers of India, from governor 
Martim Afonso de Sousa to viceroy D. Constantino, and was, 
as an ancient Professor in Lisbon, a respected person in 
India,196 he had not yet achieved the publication of his book. 
Camões intervened near D. Francisco with a huge poem that 
would be his first one to be published when Orta’s book 
was released in 1563,197 in which he praised the Coutinhos’ 
lineage reputation, mentioned the great expectations 
187  Couto 2001: 399-400.
188  Ditos…, 104.
189  Leão 1560.
190  Letter from father Francisco de Pina to his brothers, Goa, 
4.XI.1561 – DI, vol. V, doc. 34; Letter from father João Baptista do Monte 
to father Miguel de Torres, Goa, 12.XII.1561 – Idem, doc. 53.
191  Lírica… 1986, vol. I: 238.
192  Due to D. Francisco’s rivalry with them. Saraiva 1978: 32.
193  Lírica… 1986, vol. I: 244-245.
194  Idem 1986, vol. I: 246-249.
195  Idem 1989, vol. II: 263.
196  Carvalho 2015a: 95 and 101-102.
197  Lírica… 1986, vol. I: 125.
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surrounding D. Francisco’s plans against Gujarat and Aceh, 
and begged him to favour the old sciences, represented by 
Orta, promising that by supporting him he would become 
immortal and equal in reputation to the ancient Greeks.198 
 D. Francisco accepted to patronize Orta’s work by issuing 
a provision, on 5th November 1562, in which he argued on 
the book’s need and on the prestige of Orta to authorize it. 
This provision was also published with the book.199 Despite, 
Orta dedicated his book to his formal master Martim Afonso 
de Sousa, we believe that he recognized the true importance 
of D. Francisco’s support. At a time when the Inquisition was 
already in India200 and archbishop D. Gaspar had special 
powers over it, defending the persecution to Jews and New-
Christians,201 organizing the self-faiths at Goa in the presence 
of D. Francisco202 and contributing to the affirmation of the 
Inquisition of India as a lab of experiments for Portugal 
in which mission and persecution messed themselves,203 
Coutinho’s support came at the right time. 
Despite the clear importance of Orta’s book at his time 
and its support by the Jesuits, the Franciscans and of the 
inquisitor Aleixo Dias Falcão, it is important to bear in mind 
that Orta’s book was the only one of his time not to be 
supervised by archbishop D. Gaspar and that after Orta’s 
death, in 1568, his sister was burned by the Inquisition of 
India, in 1569, due to her Jewish ascendance.204 If it is true 
that by patronizing Orta, D. Francisco was also winning a 
place in History as his patron, independently on his military 
and political successes,205 it is no less true that very difficulty 
Orta’s book could be published without problems, before 
his death, during a government such as the one of D. 
Francisco’s successor, D. Antão de Noronha, who witnessed 
the hardening of counter-reformist policies.206 
For D. Francisco, supporting both Camões and Orta was 
not only a natural stand and the probable continuation of 
what other Coutinhos had already done, but it had a clear 
advantage: that of portraying a better image of himself, 
especially considering the opposition he faced, the feeling of 
delusion his government inspired and the problems he left in 
Portuguese Asia to be solved with his quick disappearance. 
3.5.  A sudden and mysterious death: D. Francisco’s polemi-
cal legacy for India
On 19th February 1564, the “earl viceroy” was found dead 
in his bed at Goa. Although, some sources state that he was 
ill since 1561,207 others link his death to the arriving news 
about captain Mesquita’s action208 and other witnesses 
stress that he “died rapidly being found in a morning in his 
198  Orta 1987, vol. I: 7-9.
199  Idem: 3.
200  Although the documentation for it during D. Francisco govern-
ment is unknown (Cunha 1995).
201  Ventura 2005, vol. I: 59.
202  Letter from father Baltasar da Costa to his brothers, Goa, 
4.XII.1562 – DI, vol. V, doc. 88.
203  Marcocci and Paiva 2013: 112-113.
204  Carvalho 2015a: 144 and 155.
205  Carvalho 2015b: 70.
206  Vila-Santa 2010: 89-92.
207  Letter from D. Antão de Noronha to Queen Catherine, Goa, 
30.XII.1562 – As Gavetas…, 1962, doc. 2067.
208  Couto 1974, VII: x, 17.
bed which caused several judgments surrounding his death 
but no one knew exactly what had happened”.209 Another 
report states that “being in strong health, he was found 
dead in his bed at Goa in a morning without anyone from 
his house being able to explain what had happened, which 
caused several suspicions and theories”.210 D. Francisco’s 
successor, governor João de Mendonça, wrote that he “died 
from a too confuse and fast death that I would not dare 
tell Your Highness since I think it is not my obligation to do 
so”.211 For these reasons, a special courier had been sent, by 
land, from Hormuz, to Portugal.212  
Effectively, the circumstances of Coutinho’s death 
hovered over several critics on his government, which 
explains why governor Mendonça did not open an inquiry 
on it. Despite being plausible that on his letter from 1561,213 
the viceroy evidenced a sincere will and zeal to serve the 
King, the truth is that his government was more criticized 
than praised and the tendency to praise started only after his 
death. The only contemporary exceptions were the Mercy 
of Goa, who praised D. Francisco’s good intentions and zeal 
at the beginning,214 and a spy who praised his discretion.215
Father Belchior Barreto not only criticized D. Francisco 
for not assisting Ethiopia but wrote also that India had “a 
bad government” under his rule216 and he was not the only 
Jesuit to criticize him.217 His successor João de Mendonça 
also complained for his delays, even at his request in the 
departure of fleets to Malabar and Ceylon.218 Belchior 
Serrão, the viceroy’s secretary, who had been appointed by 
him to the financial matters on September 1562219, states 
that he did not believe in anyone and was ruling badly in 
his last months.220 D. Duarte de Eça, a good representative 
of the noblemen’s expectations, wrote that his government 
lacked events to report even stating he faced military defeat 
against Calicut in 1562.221 D. Antão de Noronha, the new 
viceroy of India appointed by Queen Catherine and Regent 
Cardinal Henry arrived at India on September 1564, charged 
Coutinho for the explosive war he found at Cananor and 
condemned him for authorizing Domingos Mesquita’s action 
which had raised all of Malabar against the Portuguese. Due 
to the serious situation he found, he suggested that the 
209  Eça 1979: 15.
210  Vallignano 1944, Part II, chap. 18: 469.
211  Letter from João de Mendonça to King Sebastian, Goa, 4.III.1564 
– ANTT, CC I-90-40, fl. 1.
212  Letter from D. Pedro de Sousa to King Sebastian, Hormuz, 
25.V.1564 – ANTT, CC I-106-135.
213  Letter from D. Francisco Coutinho to King Sebastian, Goa, 
20.XII.1561 – “Duas …” 1959: 50 and 65.
214  Letter from the Mercy of Goa to King Sebastian, Goa, 3.XI.1561 
– Documentação… 1994, doc. 60.
215  Letter from Matias Bicudo Furtado to King Sebastian, Cairo, 
18.I.1566 – Documentos... 1975, doc. 14.
216  Letter from father Belchior Nunes Barreto to father Jaime 
Lainez, Cochin, 20.I.1564 – DI, vol. VI, doc. 28, 162.
217  Vallignano 1944, part II, chap. 18.
218  Letter from João de Mendonça to King Sebastian, Goa, 4.III.1564 
– ANTT, CC I-90-40, fl. 1v. Lopo Vaz de Sequeira, captain of Goa, states 
that he had to insist with D. Francisco two times for him to send further 
ships for Malabar, on 1564 (Correia 1989: 381-382).
219  Rivara 1992, doc. 433.
220  Letter from Belchior Serrão to King Sebastian, Goa, 29.III.1564 
– ANTT, CC I-106-131.
221  Eça 1979: 15.
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Queen opened an inquiry on D. Francisco’s government.222 
But what was the exact legacy of Coutinho for the “Estado”? 
On March 1564, when João de Mendonça assumed the 
government,223 due to the absence of D. Antão de Noronha, 
the first to be named to succeed D. Francisco, and after the 
non-appointment in the royal orders of Pero Barreto Rolim224 
and D. Francisco Mascarenhas,225 immediate measures 
were taken to assist Ceylon and Malabar.226 The governor 
sent reinforcements to Malabar due to the war at Cananor, 
and imprisoned captain Mesquita, due to the ambassador’s 
protests, ending up freeing and thanking him with huge 
mercies after their departure.227 Himself a previous captain 
of Melaka, João de Mendonça promised not to delay the 
journey to Aceh and begged, without success, not to be a 
transitory governor requesting authorization to rule for 
three years in order to recover the “Estado”.228 
Despite the opposition D. Francisco faced in India, the lack 
of pepper loads to Lisbon in 1562229 and the bad information 
that captain António Mendes de Castro gave to Queen 
Catherine after his arrival to Portugal in 1563, regarding the 
disorders at Cochin, the siege of Koulan and the threat by 
Aceh to Melaka which caused captain D. Diogo de Meneses 
to warn the Queen through him,230 the Regent Cardinal 
Henry ordered that, in case of D. Antão’s death during his 
voyage to India, D. Francisco should remain as viceroy.231 This 
fact clearly shows that Lisbon still trusted him. 
But this does not mean that Coutinho was a successful 
ruler since the conclusion that he left India worse than he 
received is almost obvious, even considering the apparatus 
of his peaceful journey to Calicut in 1562. Thus, viceroy D. 
Antão had some reason in claiming his responsibilities on 
the situation he found when he arrived Goa. His minor 
successes against the Ottomans or at Daman did not make 
up for Malabar. They explain why chronicler Diogo do 
Couto, who met him personally during his government, 
stated that he was “a friend of justice and tried to work in 
order that everything would be well done”, although he 
did not mention his patronage of Garcia de Orta and Luís 
de Camões, Couto’s personal friend. His statement that his 
death caused “sadness because he was very well seen by 
all”232 is denied by all the other contemporary testimonies.
Nevertheless, Couto’s statement and sympathy for D. 
Francisco, also evident in his first Soldado Prático, should 
222  Letter from D. Antão de Noronha to Queen Catherine, Goa, 
30.XII.1562 – As Gavetas…, doc. 2067.
223  By the succession order signed by Queen Catherine on 1st March 
1562 (Rivara 1992, doc. 507).
224  Succession order to Pero Barreto Rolim, Lisbon, 1.III.1562 – 
ANTT, CC I-105-101.
225  Sucession order to D. Francisco Mascarenhas, Lisbon, 1.III.1562 
– ANTT, CC I-106-103.
226  Letter from João de Mendonça to King Sebastian, Goa, 4.III.1564 
– ANTT, CC I-90-40.
227  Couto 1947, VII: x, 18.
228  Letter from João de Mendonça to King Sebastian, Goa, 4.III.1564 
– ANTT, CC I-90-40.
229  Letter from D. Jorge de Sousa to Queen Catherine, Terceira, 
8.VII.1562 – ANTT, CC I-106-135.
230  Letter from António de Castro Mendes to Queen Catherine, 
Azores?, 20.VIII.1563 – ANTT, CC I-106-80.
231  Letter to Manuel Leitão, Lisbon, 8.III.1564 – As Gavetas…, doc. 
2968.
232  Couto 1974, VII: x, 17, 571-572.
not be disconnected from later attempts to recover his 
historical memory such as the one from Diogo Barbosa 
Machado, on the XVIII century, defending that D. Francisco 
had always served well, although his government was not 
clearly successful since he died too soon.233 On an opposite 
side was D. Francisco’s patronage of Orta and Camões. Was 
that patronage a simple attempt to recover his image as 
viceroy or was, indeed, D. Francisco Coutinho a renascent 
viceroy of India in the time of Counter-Reformation?
Conclusion
Coutinho’s political and military options for India 
influenced the emergence of the 1565-1575 crisis since his 
policy was unable to ensure enough pepper for Lisbon and 
failed to achieve peace at Malabar. The same can also be 
said for his policies concerning the application of Counter-
Reformation to Portuguese Asia since his successor D. Antão 
de Noronha did not to have the slightest margin to oppose 
those policies. Although Noronha was close to the Jesuits, 
on his arrival to India in 1564, he also became worried over 
the effects of mass baptisms on the depopulation of Goa. 
Due to this he managed to reverse the policy but ended up 
being the viceroy who ordered the further burn down of 
several Hindu temples at Goa and the one who approved all 
the main measures decided by the first provincial council of 
India, in 1567, gathered to discuss the application of Trent 
decrees to India.234 The fact that D. Antão as well had been 
appointed by Regent Cardinal Henry with orders to apply 
Trent to the missions of India, also gave him little room 
for action. Moreover, the circumstance that he succeeded 
a viceroy like Coutinho, who in vain tried to oppose the 
hardening of Counter-Reformist policies and became known 
for that, only worsened his position.
In fact, having been clearly defeated by the Jesuits’, the 
King’s and the Pope’s orders, and having even lost archbishop 
D. Gaspar’s initial support, we might say that D. Francisco’s 
political defeat influenced his successor’s ability to oppose 
the hardening of Counter-Reformist policies. Although, 
Coutinho resisted as long as he could to implement those 
measures, he ended up like governor Francisco Barreto, 
supporting them, by restarting the mass baptisms. 
Expected, by the noblemen of India, to be an 
expansionist viceroy, like his ancestor D. Constantino, D. 
Francisco’s governance became associated with the exactly 
opposite image: that of the viceroy who delusioned his 
contemporaries since he did not detach with a big conquest 
in the North, at Ceylon or at Aceh, as was expected by his 
reputation and military experience. Thus, the “earl viceroy” 
was associated with the cut of expenses, the defeats at 
Malabar and, most important of all, with the rethinking 
of the “Estado’s” in a shirking logic. These facts explain D. 
Francisco’s interest in using his patronage to Luís de Camões 
and Garcia de Orta to improve his image near that same 
nobility but, above all, in the face of History. 
 On this sense, it was not only the government of India 
which needed his concern since D. Francisco’s very less years 
at the captaincy of Arzila and its order of abandonment also 
233  Machado 1736, tomo II, book II, chap. VIII.
234  Vila-Santa 2010: 89-92.
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placed him in a low level in comparisons with his father and 
grand-fathers. Even his difficulties in improving the status of 
his house at the court of Kings John III and Sebastian, as his 
attempts to recover the patrimony from the Coutinhos of 
the house of Marialva evidence, prove that same concern 
by D. Francisco.
In fact, when observing the three main stages of his 
career (Morocco, Portugal and India) it is possible to 
conclude that the 3rd earl of Redondo did not enjoy the 
same hopeful times of his ancestors. This in turn affected D. 
Francisco’s attempts to change his image during his lifetime 
since he felt he had not only to honor the Coutinhos lineage 
but also to rival with his ancestors memory. In this sense, 
we might raise the possibility that he may have intentionally 
wanted to be portrayed for History not only as the patron of 
Garcia de Orta and Luís de Camões, but also as the viceroy 
of India at the time of Counter-Reformation who was the 
highest nobleman that had tried to oppose the deepening 
of Counter-Reformist policies. 
It is exactly on this sense and based on his personal 
political approach to religious polemics in India, that D. 
Francisco’s affirmation that he did not want to be taken 
by an Erasmus can be enlightening. Taking into account his 
policy regarding Counter-Reformation, from his opposition 
to the Jesuits, to his alliance with archbishop D. Gaspar 
to his patronage of Orta and Camões, it is possible that 
his affirmation did not only refer to the problem of the 
Christians who ran to Muslim territories, but was, somehow, 
a metaphor to his personal view of the transitions that 
were happening in Portugal and its empire regarding the 
application of Counter-Reformation. Also, by writing it 
to the King, D. Francisco was probably assuming his own 
conscience that there were already people who saw him as 
a divergent Erasmus or people that would think that from 
him once they heard of his action. Thus, although trying to 
avoid confusion with the historical memory of Erasmus, D. 
Francisco ended up being associated as “divergent” and it 
is exactly on that sense that, compared to other viceroys of 
India, he may have been a “renascent” viceroy in the time of 
Counter-Reformation. 
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